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Abstract
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided
markets. In the model, the agents have preferences over some observable agent characteristics
(called types) on the other side of the market. There are other observed characteristics aggregated
at the level of types that determine the systematic preferences over these types. These systematic
preferences enter the agent utilities in the form of a linear index. Agents also have idiosyncratic
taste shocks. This paper shows the identification of systematic preference parameters over types,
without making any parametric assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved taste shocks.
The matching model reduces to two separate discrete-choice problems linked together by market
clearing conditions, satisfied in the presence of equilibrium transfers. However, transfers are
endogenous and unobserved which makes the discrete-choice problem non-standard. This paper
gives conditions under which transfers are simply functions of the linear indices. This insight along
with variation across i.i.d. markets is used to reduce the matching model to a semiparametric
multi-index model with an unknown link function. Identification is shown under appropriate
exclusion restrictions on the regressors.
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1 Introduction
Matching markets are two-sided markets, where agents on both sides of the market have preferences
over forming matches with agents on the other side. Empirical studies of matching markets have re-
cently garnered considerable attention. Following the pioneering contribution of Becker (1973), many
such studies view matching outcomes as a competitive equilibrium with transferable utilities, and
assume that the matching process is based on exactly one characteristic. Becker’s one-dimensional
model implies that agents with similar characteristics will find it optimal to match. Typically, a
researcher observes a pattern of how the agents sort themselves into matches. These patterns can be
based on multiple characteristics and we do not always observe agents with similar characteristics
matching. Thus, the one-dimensional Beckerian model of matching is too simplistic to explain the
different match patterns that are actually observed in the data. An alternative is to allow prefer-
ences to depend on multiple characteristics, including those that are latent (or private to the agent).
The research goal is to then identify the underlying preferences that explain observed match pat-
terns. Estimates of these preferences can be used to understand the relative importance of different
characteristics in the equilibrium matching of agents (Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque
2012), to estimate the gains to matching (Botticini and Siow 2008), or to do counterfactual analysis
(Chiappori, Salanie´, and Weiss 2017).
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the identification and estimation of preference
parameters in one-to-one matching models with transferable utilities. Typically, matching markets
have two disjoint groups of agents (called “sides” of the market). Agents on each side of the market
can either form a match with exactly one agent on the other side, or remain unmatched. On each
side, agents are divided into a finite number of groups called “types”. A type corresponds to one or
more characteristics of agents over which we observe sorting. Agents on each side have preferences
defined over the set of types, instead of over the set of all agents, on the other side. A match between
two agents, say agent k of type i on one side and agent l of type j on the other side, is formed when
both agents find forming the match utility-maximizing. We allow preferences to include transferable
utilities. Transfers act as prices which are determined simultaneously with the match allocation, and
adjust in a way that each agent maximizes their utility and the market clears. In particular, we
impose the following structure on utilities,
Side a : uk,ij = Xijαi + εkj − τij ,
Side b : vl,ij = Zijβj + νil + τij , (1)
where uk,ij is utility of agent k of type i when matched with an agent of type j on the other
side, and vl,ij is utility of agent l of type j when matched with agent of type i on the other side.
Here, Xijαi, Zijβj are linear indices which capture the systematic part of the preferences of agents
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matching; εkj , νil are idiosyncratic taste shocks specific to each agent; and τij are equilibrium transfers
associated with each type of match. The match allocation supported by these equilibrium transfers
will be unique, efficient, and pairwise stable. These properties of one-to-one matching with transfers
have been studied in Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972), Becker (1973,
1974), Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999) and have been summarized in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990, Chapter 8).
The preference structure in (1) is similar to the ones studied in Choo and Siow (2006) and
Galichon and Salanie´ (2015). As in their models, agents’ preferences are composed of three additively
separable parts that depend solely on the type of match being formed, transfers, and an idiosyncratic
taste shock. We deviate from the Choo-Siow and Galichon-Salanie´ framework in the following three
ways. First, we explicitly model the systematic part of the preferences as a function of some covariates
that characterize the types. Second, we make no parametric assumptions on the distribution of the
taste shocks, ε, ν. Third, we exploit variation across multiple similar markets for identification.
Our goal is to identify and estimate the systematic part of preferences, which in our model corre-
sponds to the coefficients, αi, βj , of the linear index that enters agent utilities. Since, in equilibrium,
every agent is maximizing preferences over a finite number of alternatives, we can view the matching
process as a discrete-choice problem on the two sides. There is a large literature on the identification
and estimation of such parameters in discrete-choice models. However, the discrete-choice problems
in our framework are non-standard as they depend on transfers, τij , which are not observed by the
researcher. In this paper we view transfers as functions of type attributes (Xij and Zij), where
a transfer function maps observed covariates to equilibrium transfers. We show that the transfer
functions depend on these characteristics only through the linear indices. With this insight we are
able to reduce the matching model in many markets to a conditional mean model which resembles a
more familiar problem in econometrics.
In each market, the discrete-choice problem generates a vector of match proportions (for every
type of match that can be formed) as functions of the linear index, transfer function, and distribution
of unobserved taste shocks. Aggregating this information across all markets and using our result on
transfer functions, we are able to reduce this to a multiple index model with unknown link functions
and multiple equations. This approach is new in matching models.
We show that the coefficient of the indices is identified up to a scaled normalization under some
exclusion restrictions, and smoothness and non-linearity restrictions on the unknown link function.
These assumptions are similar to the ones made in Ichimura and Lee (1991), which studies identifica-
tion in a semiparametric multi-index model with a single equation. Here we modify the assumptions
to accommodate for multiple equations.
The literature on identification of preferences in matching models with transferable utility can
be broadly divided into two strands based on whether the choice sets of agents consist of types
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or individual agents. The one-to-one matching model with transferable utility has mostly been
studied where agents choose types rather than individual agents, where agents of the same type are
assumed to be exchangeable. Among these are Echenique et al. (2013), Dupuy and Galichon (2014),
Galichon and Salanie´ (2015), Graham (2013b) among others, which build on the seminal work of
Choo and Siow (2006). Choo and Siow (2006; henceforth, the CS model) consider identification of
the systematic preference parameters as solely a function of the match pattern when the number of
types is finite. However, this approach does not explain why such preferences occur. In this paper,
we model what factors determine these preferences by introducing covariates in the systematic part
of the utility.
The CS model also allows for matching to occur on unobserved idiosyncratic taste shocks that
can be different for every agent. They identify systematic preferences by assuming unobserved taste
shocks to be distributed as extreme value type I. This model is extended in Graham (2013b), where
the unobservables are still assumed to have an extreme value distribution but an unknown scaling
parameter is added to this distribution on both sides. Galichon and Salanie´ (2015) also study the
CS model where the unobservables can belong to a richer class of distributions, but where the
distribution still needs to be known a priori. Echenique et al. (2013) also consider identification in
matching models with transferable utility, but their model differs from the CS model as it allows for
only aggregate taste shocks (identical shocks for all individuals with the same type). Galichon and
Dupuy (2014) extends the CS model to a continuous logit model. All of these papers use a single
large market for identification. In this paper, we make no parametric assumptions on the distribution
of the unobserved taste shock. Thus, in contrast to the existing literature, we cannot rely on the
shape of these distributions to yield identification. Instead, we use variation across many markets in
the covariates, introduced in the systematic preferences, for identification.
On the other hand, Fox (2010), Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012), and Fox,
Hsu, and Yang (2017) consider identification of features of the match surplus function when the
choice set consists of individual agents. Agents are not exchangeable in this context. Fox (2010)
relies on a “rank order” assumption, and Fox, Hsu, and Yang (2017) allow for match preferences to
be based on observable and unobservable characteristics. However, their objective is complementary
to ours, in that they are interested in identifying features of the distribution of the unobservables.
Finally, Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) present a general model of matching
with unobserved heterogeneity, but recover the systematic part of the preferences only ordinally. All
these papers observe matching data from multiple markets.
The CS framework has been used in many empirical papers that have studied marriage patterns,
see Fox (2009) for a review. For example, Choo and Siow (2006) used it to link changes in gains
to marriage and abortion laws. Siow and Choo (2006) apply this model to measure the impact of
demographic changes on matching patterns. Botticini and Siow (2008) and Chiappori, Salanie, and
3
Weiss (2017) use this model to study returns to education on the marriage market. Banerjee et al.
(2013) estimates the impact of caste and non-caste attributes in determining matching patterns in
India. Although marriage markets are a leading application of this setting, there are other markets
that can be modeled in this framework, for example, the matching of firms with CEOs (Tervio 2008,
and Gabaix and Landier 2008).
There is also a recent related literature that studies identification of preferences with match out-
comes in a one-to-one non-transferable utilities framework (see for example Dagsvik 2000, Agarwal
and Diamond 2017, and Menzel 2015). In these models, the choice sets of agents are endogenous,
making the discrete-choice approach non-standard. In this setting, pairwise stable match alloca-
tions are not unique (in contrast to transferable utility models, where match allocations are unique).
Finally, Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2016) consider one-to-one matching in imperfectly trans-
ferable utility models which differ from TU models in that a pairwise stable outcome may no longer
coincide with the efficient outcome. See Chiappori and Salanie´ (2016) for a recent survey of matching
models in econometrics.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the matching framework
and the notation. We explore the role of transfers and present the main result on transfers in Section
2.2. We use this result in Section 3 to aggregate matching information over many markets and reduce
the problem to a semiparametric multi-index model. Section 4 discusses the assumptions under which
the parameters (coefficients of the linear indices) in the reduced form model are identified. Finally,
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let T = {1, · · · , T} be the set of all markets. Each market t ∈ T is a matching market composed
of two sides, a and b. For any market t, let Nat be the set of all agents on side a and Nbt be
the set of all agents on side b. We will not allow any overlap between these two sets of agents;
that is, Nat ∩Nbt = ∅. Agents on each side will be characterized by their types. A type denotes
some characteristic(s) that are common to a subset of agents on a given side of the market. Let
I = {1, · · · , I} be the finite set of types on side a and J = {1, · · · , J} be the finite set of types on
side b.
To assign types to agents we introduce the functions
i : Nat → I,
j : Nbt → J.
1Graham (2011, 2013a) provide older surveys on this topic.
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Note I and J stay the same across every market. In any market t ∈ T, let sait denote the proportion
of type i agents on side a, and sbjt denote the proportion of type j agents on side b. The vector
St = (sa1t, · · · , saIt, sb1t, · · · , sbJt) then characterizes the proportions of types in market t.
In a one-to-one matching model each agent on side a is allowed to match with exactly one agent
on side b, or agents can remain unmatched. If agent k ∈ Nat matches with agent l ∈ Nbt, then the
match pair will be denoted by (k, l). All match pairs (k, l) such that i(k) = i and j(l) = j are said
to be of match type (i, j). If k ∈ Nat where i(k) = i remains unmatched, we will denote the match
pair by (k, 0) and the match type by (i, 0). Similarly, if l ∈ Nbt where j(l) = j remains unmatched,
we will denote the match pair by (0, l) and the match type by (0, j). Let M be the collection of all
match types where,
M = {(i, j) : i ∈ I ∪ {0}, j ∈ J ∪ {0}, (i, j) 6= (0, 0)}.
Any agent has preferences over the set of types on the other side of the market. These preferences
are determined by a systematic part that is common to agents of the same type, and an idiosyncratic
part that can be different for each agent. For instance, an agent k ∈ Nat with i(k) = i has preferences
over the set J ∪ {0} composed of a systematic part that only depends on its type i and a vector of
the agent’s idiosyncratic taste shocks, εkt. We model the systematic part of the utility for a match
as functions of covariates (denoted by Xijt) that characterize the types. That is, Xijt captures the
various attributes of a match type (i, j) that agents of type i care about. These covariates have to
vary with types and market. The vector of idiosyncratic taste shocks for agent k of type i is given by
εkt = (εk0t, εk1t, εk2t, · · · , εkJt). This is drawn from a distribution Fi for each i ∈ I, where εkjt denotes
k’s personal taste to match with type j agents on the other side, j = 1, · · · , J, and εk0t denotes k’s
personal taste to remain unmatched. Similarly, an agent l ∈ Nbt with j(l) = j will have preferences
over the set I∪ {0} based on a systematic part that is a function of covariates, Zijt, and the agent’s
idiosyncratic taste shock νlt, where νlt = (ν0lt, ν1lt, · · · , νIlt). This is drawn from a distribution Gj
for all j ∈ J. We will assume that, for all i and j, Fi and Gj are the same across all markets.
Let the number of (i, j) matches in market t be denoted by piijt, for any (i, j) ∈M. Then define
the match allocation in market t to be the following matrix,
Πt =

pi11t pi12t · · · pi1J pi10t
pi21t pi22t · · · pi2Jt pi20t
...
...
. . .
...
...
piI1t piI2t · · · piIJt piI0t
pi01t pi02t · · · pi0Jt −

,
where the (I + 1, J + 1)th element has been removed as it has no meaning.
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The match allocation in each market t will be viewed as the competitive equilibrium of an economy
with transferable utilities.2 A competitive equilibrium will be a match allocation and an I×J matrix
of equilibrium transfers Γt, where
Γt =

τ11t · · · τ1Jt
...
. . .
τI1t τIJt
 .
The transfers τijt will only depend on the match type (i, j) and not on the identity (k, l) of the match
(this will follow from arguments in Salanie´ (2015)).
In a competitive equilibrium each match pair will share a match surplus according to the equi-
librium transfers. The share of agents k and l in an (i, j) match type are given by
Uk,ijt = Xijtαi + εkjt − τijt,
Ul,ijt = Zijtβj + νilt + τ ijt, (2)
where i(k) = i and j(l) = j. Here Xijt and Zijt represent dx and dz dimensional vectors of covariates
(that characterize match types), respectively, for every match type (i, j) ∈ I × J and every market
t ∈ T. These covariates enter through linear indices with coefficients αi ∈ Rdx for every i ∈ I and
βj ∈ Rdz for every j ∈ J. The linear indices represent the systematic part of the preferences. As
introduced above, εkjt denotes the taste shock for agent k on side a for type j agents on side b; νilt
denotes the taste shock for agent l on side b for type i agents on side a. If agents remain unmatched,
there are no transfers to be exchanged, and we normalize the linear index component to be zero.
Then utility of unmatched agents k ∈ Nat of match type (i, 0) and l ∈ Nbt of match type (0, j) are
given by
Uk,i0t = εk0t and Ul,0jt = ν0lt,
respectively.
In any market t ∈ T, a competitive equilibrium will be defined as a set of transfers Γt and
a match allocation Πt such that every agent maximizes their utility and the market clears. The
complete choice set of agents on side a is given by J ∪ {0} and for agents on side b is given by
2The usual notion of equilibrium in matching games is that of pairwise stability. In one-to-one transferable utility
models the match allocation in a pairwise stable match outcome coincides with the match allocation in a competitive
equilibrium (Shapley and Shubik 1972). Moreover, when markets are large (an assumption that we formalize in Section
2.3) there are unique transfers (or, prices) that support the equilibrium match allocation (Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame
(1992,1999)).
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I ∪ {0} . Then in equilibrium, for a match (k, l) of match type (i, j) ∈M to occur it must be that
j ∈ arg max
j′∈J∪{0}
Uk,ij′t,
i ∈ arg max
i′∈I∪{0}
Ul,i′jt. (3)
and the markets clear,
J∑
j=0
piijt = sait|Nat|, ∀ i ∈ I,
I∑
i=0
piijt = sbjt|Nbt|, ∀ j ∈ J. (4)
The equilibrium match allocation will be unique even if transfers are not ( see Shapley and Shubik
1972; Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame 1992).
2.1 Example: A Marriage Market
In this subsection we will describe a marriage market in the setting of our model. In the rest of the
paper we will use this example to illustrate the main assumptions and the intuition for the results.
Consider a marriage market where the set of men and women form two sides of a market. In
this context we can think of a market to be a city. To keep with the application in Choo and Siow
(2006), let types be given by age on both sides. Choo and Siow let types be given by the different
ages between 16 and 75. Some of their findings include that a 20-year-old man prefers to match with
a slightly younger woman, and a 20-year-old woman prefers to match with a slightly older man. On
the other hand, 40-year-old men and women have more dispersed preferences.3 This paper suggests
an approach to further understanding these preferences.
Here, for the ease of exposition, suppose there are only two age types on each side
I = {20, 40}, J = {20, 40}.
The different match types in set M will be given by the following cells:
3Choo and Siow (2006) measure preferences as distribution of systematic net gains from marriage. These are
quantities of the type log(piij/pii0) which denotes net gains of a type i man from matching a type j woman relative
to remaining unmatched. Similarly, log(piij/pi0j) denotes net gains of a type j woman from matching a type i man
relative to remaining unmatched.
7
Women
Age 20 Age 40
Age 20 (20, 20) (20, 40) (20, 0)
Men Age 40 (40, 20) (40, 40) (40, 0)
(0, 20) (0, 40) - .
Suppose agents’ preferences over types are based on expected education levels and the expected
income of their spouse. Moreover, agents care about having similar expected education levels as their
spouse.4 Then covariates Xijt can contain variables (Xijt,educ, Xjt,inc) where Xijt,educ = |Xit,educ −
Xjt,educ| denotes the difference in expected education between a type i (i.e. age i) man and a type
j (i.e. age j) woman, and Xjt,inc denotes the expected income for a type j woman. Similarly, we
can define covariates Zijt = (Zijt,educ, Zit,inc). The characteristics in Xijt captures the attributes of
match type (i, j) and the type of match partner j, and Zijt captures the attributes of match type
(i, j) and type of match partner i.
The systematic part of the preferences of a man of type i for a woman of type j is given by index
Xijtαi where αi = (αi,educ, αi,inc)
′. Similarly, the systematic part of the preferences of a woman of
type j for a man of type i is given by index Zijtβj where βj = (βj,educ, βj,inc)
′. These coefficients act
as weights that the agents put on the different type characteristics.
We also introduced the variable St which represented the proportions of types. The role of this
is explained in Section 2.3. Suppose that the population of men in some market t (which is a city)
is composed 60% of 20-year-olds and 40% of 40-year-olds, and the population of women is composed
of 50% of 20-year-olds and 40-year-olds. Then, St = (0.6, 0.4, 0.5, 0.5).
An important distinction from the CS framework is that, here, types i, j and covariates Xijt and
Zijt are different objects. In the CS model, including additional covariates corresponds to increasing
the number of types. For example, consider including agent education in the marriage example
above which takes only two values {High, Low}, say. Then the number of types of the form (age,
education) increases from two to four on each side,
I = {(20, H), (20, L), (40, H), (40, L)}, J = {(20, H), (20, L), (40, H), (40, L)}.
Also all possible match types increase from 8 cells to 24 cells. So making agent preferences depend on
several factors like income, education, age, etc. will increase the number of match types and typically
leads to the practical problem of having many empty (or thin) cells in the data.5 In contrast, in
4In practice, we can measure expected income (education) of an agent of type i as the average income (education) of
type i agents. Instead of expectations (or, averages) we could have considered any aggregate measure of the variables
education and income that could characterize a match type (i, j).
5This is a common problem in empirical discrete-choice problems and also encountered in the empirical section of
Choo and Siow (2006; see footnote 15).
8
the setup described in this paper, we have to first take a stand on which characteristic(s) will define
types (e.g. age), and then use these types to aggregate other characteristics (e.g. education, income)
that agents may care about. This has two implications different from the CS model. First, we can
make the systematic part of the preferences depend on a rich set of covariates without increasing
the number of elements in the set of match types, M. In this sense, we are carrying out a dimension
reduction of the set M in the CS framework. Second, it imposes structure on the systematic part
of preferences over types, as functions of other characteristics. Thus, we can study what determines
preferences over types.
2.2 Discussion on Agent Preferences
As in the CS framework, agents on one side of the market have preferences only over the type of
agents on the other side and not on the individual identity of the agent. That is, any k ∈ Nat on
side a ranks the elements of set J ∪ {0} and not Nbt. Similarly, any l ∈ Nbt on side b ranks the
elements of set I ∪ {0}. This is captured by the utility specification in (2) where the utility of agent
k from match (k, l) of type (i, j) does not depend on l but only on type j. Similarly, the utility for l
only depends on type of match partner i and not on k. An implication of this is that agents of the
same type act as perfect substitutes (or, are exchangeable) for agents on the other side. For instance,
suppose k ∈ Nat has most preferred type j on side b, and let l, l′ ∈ Nbt be such that j(l) = j(l′) = j.
Then, k is indifferent between matching with l and l′. Thus, even though the model cannot capture
why agents on side a match with agent l versus agent l′, it does capture why they choose type j
versus type j′. In the marriage example in Section 2.1, it means that each man (woman) treats
women (men) of a given type as exchangeable.
The systematic part of preferences over types are determined by covariates Xijt and Zijt which
are aggregated at the level of types. In the marriage example, one of the group attributes for,
say, 20-year-old women is X20t,inc which denotes the expected income of 20-year-old women in the
market. Also suppose X20,20,tα20 > X20,40,tα20 > X20,0,tα20, then the systematic preference of any
20 year-old-man is given by: marry a 20-year-old woman  marry a 40-year-old woman  remain
unmatched.
Further, agents of the same type can have different preferences (heterogenous tastes) due to
the presence of idiosyncratic taste shocks, εkj and νil. This is even though the agents of a given
type have the same systematic preferences. For example, consider two 20-year-old men k and k′.
Then εkt and εk′t can take realizations such that X20,20,tα20 + εk,20,t > X20,40,tα20 + εk,40,t and
X20,20,tα20 + εk′,20,t < X20,40,tα20 + εk′,40,t. Then, ignoring transfers, k will prefer to marry a 20-
year-old woman, whereas k′ will prefer to marry a 40-year-old woman. We aggregate over these
idiosyncratic taste shocks and use exchangeability of agents of the same type to compute market
shares of matches in each market, in Section 3.
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It is worth observing that we allow αi to differ with i and βj to differ with j. This allows
for heterogeneity across types in the systematic part of preferences and does not rule out match
preferences where, for example, older (younger) types systematically prefer to match with older
(younger) types. This flexibility seems important to capture realistic patterns of preferences.
Of course, an important choice in our framework is which attributes of an individual should
determine the types, and which should be captured in the covariates, Xijt, Zijt. In practice, a range of
factors may determine this choice. One is the dimension reduction aspect discussed above. Another
may reflect the researcher’s understanding of the matching process. For instance, types may be
attributes observable to agents at the time of the match (e.g. ethnicity, age) while the covariates
may be unobserved but inferred based on the observable types (e.g. income).
2.3 Transfers
Transfers play an important role in our model, as they ensure markets clear.6 With transfers entering
the utility specification directly, we can treat all agents as maximizing their preferences over the entire
type set and their outside option to remain unmatched. This is simply a discrete-choice model on
both sides in each market. The complication here is that transfers are endogenous and not observed.
Thus, we are unable to use results directly from the discrete-choice literature.
In the existing matching literature with transferable utilities, there are two approaches to han-
dling transfers. The first approach relies on functional form assumptions on the distribution of
ε and ν. For instance, if we assume (as in Choo and Siow, 2006) that, for any agent k ∈ Nat
and l ∈ Nbt, {εkj : j ∈ J ∪ {0}} and {νil : i ∈ I ∪ {0}} are drawn independently from the
extreme value type I distribution, then the systematic part of the match surplus is identified as
Xijαi +Zijβj = log(piij/pii0) + log(piij/pi0j), for all (i, j). As Choo and Siow (2006) show, this follows
by eliminating transfers using the logit specification. Here, we instead allow the joint distribution
of (εk0, εk1, · · · , εkJ) ∼ Fi, i(k) = i, to be unknown and have an arbitrary correlation structure. We
also allow Fi to be different for different types i ∈ I. The same is true for each Gj . Therefore, here
we cannot use the shape of the distribution functions to eliminate transfers.
The second approach to deal with transfers exploits the efficiency property of the equilibrium,
which says that the match allocation Πt maximizes the total match surplus in the market t. Thus,
one only needs to consider the sum of total match surplus in the market, which does not involve
any transfer terms. Fox (2010) assumes a rank-order property to nonparametrically identify the
match surplus function. Galichon and Salanie´ (2015) consider the surplus maximization problem
as a convex optimization problem. This determines the match surplus in terms of distributions Fi
and Gj (for all i and j) which are assumed to be known a priori. Their approach does not apply to
settings where Fi and Gj are unknown.
6For a discussion on having transferable utilities for marriage see Becker (1973).
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In this section we will show that, under some assumptions, transfers are functions of the linear
indices introduced in equations (2). This gives us an alternative way to deal with transfers which is
new in the literature.
Let
Xt = (X11t, X12t, · · · , X1Jt, X21t, X22t, · · · , XIJt) ∈ X IJ , X ⊆ Rdx ,
Zt = (Z11t, Z21t, · · · , ZI1t, Z12t, Z22t, · · · , ZIJt) ∈ ZIJ , Z ⊆ Rdz ,
be the lists of all covariate vectors in a market t. A market’s characteristics are then summarized by
(Πt, Xt, Zt, St), where recall that Πt is the equilibrium match allocation and St gives the proportions
of types. We impose the following assumptions on the sample of markets from which the data is
drawn.
First, we make a large market assumption common in the literature which will guarantee the
uniqueness of equilibrium transfers in each market. This will involve assuming that sets Nat and
Nbt for each market t are masses of infinitesimal agents (see Galichon and Salanie´ 2015, for a similar
assumption).
Assumption 2.1 In each market t, agents are infinitesimal and the total mass of the population is
normalized to 1, with
∑I
i=1 sait +
∑J
j=1 sbjt = 1.
Our approach is intended to exploit data on many markets by making use of the following further
assumption.
Assumption 2.2 (a) The distributions of shocks, as given by {Fi : i ∈ I} and {Gj : j ∈ J} for all
i and j, do not depend on the market t nor on the realization of market covariates Xt and Zt.
(b) For all i and j, Fi and Gj are absolutely continuous and have full support on RJ+1 and RI+1,
respectively.
Given these assumptions, transfers will be determined in equilibrium in each market as a function
of market covariates and the proportions of types. We can then view transfers in each market as
determined via a transfer function, which maps market characteristics to T ⊆ RI×J , the set of all
possible transfer matrices Γt. Such a function may be denoted γ˜t, where
γ˜t : X IJ ×ZIJ ×∆I+J → T such that Γt ≡ γ˜t(Xt, Zt, St),
with ∆I+J a simplex in RI+J .
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 together ensure that the equilibrium proportions of match types and
transfers only depend on market covariates Xt, Zt and St. Were markets small (that is, without
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Assumption 2.1), the match proportions and transfers would depend on the realizations of the id-
iosyncratic shocks. Were distributions of idiosyncratic shocks to vary across markets (that is, without
Assumption 2.2(a)), matchings and transfers would vary with the idiosyncratic shock distributions
even when markets are large. Hence, Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are precisely those required to ensure
that the transfer functions γ˜t do not vary across markets t (henceforth, we drop the subscript t,
Γt = γ˜(Xt, Zt, St) for all t).
We will now show that, in addition, Xt and Zt enter the transfer function through linear indices.
To this end, define
Xtα ≡ (X11tα1, X12tα1, · · · , X1Jtα1, X21tα2, X22tα2, · · · , XIJtαI) ∈ RIJ ,
Ztβ ≡ (Z11tβ1, Z21tβ1, · · · , ZI1tβ1, Z12tβ2, Z22tβ2, · · · , ZIJtβJ) ∈ RIJ ,
to be the list of all possible indices in market t.
Proposition 2.3 Under utility specification given by (2) and assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, there exists
a transfer function γ : RIJ × RIJ → T ⊆ RI×J such that
Γt = γ(Xtα,Ztβ, St)
for any market t ∈ T.
The result follows from recalling that any equilibrium in a given market t maximizes total surplus
in that market. Transfers that depend directly on market covariates Xt and Zt, and not only on
the indices Xtα and Ztβ are not consistent with surplus maximization. The argument is made
formally in the Appendix. Throughout, we will denote the (i, j)th element of γ(Xtα,Ztβ, St) by
γij(Xtα,Ztβ, St).
Proposition 2.3 is crucial in what follows. We use this result to map the observed match probabil-
ities to the parameters α = (α1, α2, · · · , αI) where αi ∈ Rdx for each i ∈ I, and β = (β1, β2, · · · , βJ)
where βj ∈ Rdz for each j ∈ J. Aggregating these across the T markets we are left with a conditional
mean model, which links the observed data to model parameters α and β through an infinite-
dimensional nuisance parameter (which arises since we do not make any parametric assumptions on
the distribution of ε and ν, and since the transfer function is unobserved). This proposition is the
key insight from this paper that links the matching model to a semiparametric multi-index model.
Section 3 studies this link more carefully.
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3 Reduced Form Model
Before we establish a link between the data and the parameters of interest, we first look at the
match probabilities in a fixed market t ∈ T, where T is a sample of markets. There are two separate
discrete-choice problems in market t, one for side a and one for side b. Define |Nat| + |Nbt| = Nt.
Recall that the proportions of types in the market is given by St = (sa1t, · · · , saIt, sb1t, · · · , sbJt),
where sait is the proportion of side a agents that are type i, and sbjt is the proportion of side b
agents that are type j.
Define
paijt ≡
piijt
saitNt
to be the match probability that type i agents on side a matches with type j, and
pbijt ≡
piijt
sbjtNt
to be the match probability that type j agents on side b that matches with type i, conditional on
market covariates Xt = X,Zt = Z. In the marriage example of Section 2.1, sait is the proportion of
men that are type i and Nt is the total number of agents in the market. Therefore, saitNt is the total
number of type i men. Similarly, sbjtNt is total number of type j women. The above expressions
for paijt and p
b
ijt transform the match outcome matrix in terms of conditional choice probabilities for
each type on both sides.
Also denote the joint distribution of
{
(εkj′ − εkj) : i(k) = i, j′ ∈ J ∪ {0}, and j′ 6= j
}
by Fij ,
and the joint distribution of {(νi′l − νil) : j(l) = j, i′ ∈ I ∪ {0}, and i′ 6= i} by Gij . Then for each
type i ∈ I we have,
paijt = Fij(Xijαi − τij , · · · , Xijαi −Xij−1αi − τij + τij−1, Xijαi −Xij+1αi − τij + τij+1, · · · ) (5)
for all j ∈ J ∪ {0}, such that ∑Jj=0 paijt = 1. Similarly, for each type j ∈ J we have,
pbijt = Gij(Zijβj + τij , · · · , Zijβj − Zi−1jβj + τij − τi−1j , Zijβj − Zi+1jβj + τij − τi+1j , · · · ) (6)
for all i ∈ I ∪ {0}, such that ∑Ii=0 pbijt = 1.
Under the assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 we know that τij = γij(Xtα,Ztβ, St). Therefore, (5) and (6)
can just be written as H˜aij(Xtα,Ztβ, St) and H˜
b
ij(Xtα,Ztβ, St), respectively. The following observa-
tion summarizes the main properties of the functions H˜qij , for q ∈ {a,b}.
Observation 3.1 For any q ∈ {a,b},
(a) H˜qij does not depend on t. This is because Fij , Gij , γij are market invariant.
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(b) H˜qij : R2IJ ×∆I+J → [0, 1].
(c)
∑J
j=0 H˜
a
ij(Xtα,Ztβ, St) = 1 for all i ∈ I. And,
∑I
i=0 H˜
b
ij(Xtα,Ztβ, St) = 1 for all j ∈ J.
(d) There will be IJ + I functions of the form H˜aij , and IJ + J functions of the type H˜
b
ij.
In fact in every market t ∈ T we will have the following system of 2IJ + I + J equations,
pa1jt = H˜
a
1j(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ j ∈ J ∪ {0},
J∑
j=0
pa1jt = 1,
pa2jt = H˜
a
2j(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ j ∈ J ∪ {0},
J∑
j=0
pa2jt = 1,
...
paIjt = H˜
a
Ij(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ j ∈ J ∪ {0},
J∑
j=0
paIjt = 1, (7)
pbi1t = H˜
b
i1(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ i ∈ I ∪ {0},
I∑
i=0
pbi1t = 1,
pbi2t = H˜
b
i2(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ i ∈ I ∪ {0},
I∑
i=0
pbi2t = 1,
...
pbiJt = H˜
b
iJ(Xtα,Ztβ, St), ∀ i ∈ I ∪ {0},
I∑
i=0
pbiJt = 1.
The econometrician will observe yaijt, the sample proportion of type i agents on side a that
matches with type j, and ybijt, the sample proportion of type j agents on side b that match with type
i.7 Define
Yt =
(
Y at
Y bt
)
,
where
Y at = (y
a
10t, y
a
11t, · · · , ya1Jt, · · · , yaI0t, aI1t, · · · , yaIJt),
7Constructing yaijt and y
b
ijt, from a sample Nˆt of agents in market t. Let Πˆt be the match allocation in the sample
observed in market t, where its elements pˆiijt denotes the observed number of (i, j) matches in the sample. Let
Sˆt = (sˆa1t, · · · , sˆaIt, sˆb1t, · · · , sˆbJt), be the observed distribution of types in the sample of Nˆt agents. That is, sˆait is
the observed proportion of side a agents that are type i, and sˆbjt is the observed proportion of side b agents that are
type j, in the sample. Define
yaijt ≡ pˆiijt
sˆaitNˆt
and ybijt ≡ pˆiijt
sˆbjtNˆt
.
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Y bt = (y
b
01t, y
b
11t, · · · , ybI1t, · · · , yb0Jt, yb1Jt, · · · , ybIJt),
are vectors of dimension IJ + I and IJ + J , respectively. Therefore in every market t ∈ T, the
econometrician observes, Yt ∈ Y ⊆ [0, 1]2IJ+I+J , Xt ∈ X IJ , and Zt ∈ ZIJ .
Let eaijt and e
b
ijt be the projection error, i.e. it is defined to be the difference between the true
and sample match proportions. Then we have,
yaijt = p
a
ijt + e
a
ijt,
ybijt = p
b
ijt + e
b
ijt,
such that
E
(
eaijt|Xt, Zt, St
)
= E
(
ebijt|Xt, Zt, St
)
= 0. (8)
We can now write the system of equations (7) as,
E(Yt|Xt, Zt, St) = H˜(Xtα,Ztβ, St) (9)
where H˜ is vector of functions that does not change with t, of dimension 2IJ + I + J. In particular,
H˜ : R2IJ ×∆I+J → [0, 1]2IJ+I+J . The components of H˜ are given by
E[yqijt|Xt, Zt, St] = H˜qij(Xtα,Ztβ, St),
for q = a, (i, j) ∈ I × (J ∪ {0}), and q = b, (i, j) ∈ (I ∪ {0}) × J. Further, integrating equation (9)
over St, by law of iterated expectation we have that
E[Yt|Xt, Zt] = H(Xtα,Ztβ), (10)
where H(Xtα,Ztβ) =
´
H˜(Xtα,Ztβ, St)dFS , and FS is the CDF of St.
Equation (10) gives the reduced form model. This maps the data {(Yt, Xt, Zt) : t ∈ T} to
the unknown parameters of the model (H, {αi} i∈I, {βj} j∈J). The goal of this paper is to iden-
tify the systematic preference parameters α1, α2, . . . , αI and β1, β2, . . . , βJ in the presence of the
infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter H. This is a semiparametric multi-index model with multi-
ple equations. Note that without proposition 2.3 we could not have written the conditional mean
function in terms of the indices alone.
The Marriage Example (continued from Section 2.1) Recall that Xijt = (Xijt,educ, Xjt,inc) and
Zijt = (Zijt,educ, Zit,inc), for (i, j) ∈ {20, 40}×{20, 40}. For instance, X20,40,t = (X20,40,t,educ, X40,t,inc)
where X20,40,t,educ is the absolute difference between expected education of 20-year-old men and
expected education of 40-year-old women in market t, and X40,t,inc is the expected income of 40-
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year-old men in market t. Here, we will observe the proportions of 20-year-old men matching 20-year-
old women (ya20,20,t), 40-year-old women (y
a
20,40,t), and proportions remaining unmatched (y
a
20,0,t).
Similarly, we observe matching proportions for 40-year-old men (ya40,20,t,y
a
40,40,t,y
a
40,0,t), 20-year-old
women (yb20,20,t,y
b
40,20,t,y
b
0,20,t), and 40-year-old women (y
b
20,40,t,y
b
40,40,t,y
b
0,40,t). Therefore, the outcome
vector Yt is given by,
Yt = (y
a
20,0,t, y
a
20,20,t, y
a
20,40,t, y
a
40,0,t, y
a
40,20,t, y
a
40,40,t, y
b
0,20,t, y
b
20,20,t, y
b
40,20,t, y
b
0,40,t, y
b
20,40,t, y
b
40,40,t)
′.
Any component of Yt (say, y
b
40,20,t) can be written as
E(yb40,20,t|Xt, Zt) = Hb40,20(X20,20,tα20, X20,40,tα20, X40,20,tα40, X40,40,tα40,
Z20,20,tβ20, Z20,40,tβ40, Z40,20,tβ20, Z40,40,tβ40)
where Hb40,20 is an unknown function with eight arguments. There are twelve such equations (one
for each component of Yt) with cross-equation restrictions such as, H
b
20,20 +H
b
40,20 +H
b
0,20 = 1.
4 Identification
In the previous section, we reduced the matching model in T markets to the following semiparametric
multi-index model,
E(Yt|Xt, Zt) = H(Xtα,Ztβ), t ∈ T.
Multi-index models have been studied in detail in Ichimura and Lee (1991) when there is only one
equation. Here, we have 2IJ + I + J with cross-equation restrictions. In this section, we study the
identification of preference parameters α = (α1, α2, · · · , αI) ∈ Rdx × RI and β = (β1, β2, · · · , βJ) ∈
Rdz × RJ under conditions that are similar to Ichimura and Lee (1991). The main difference is in
the exclusion restrictions we impose which are specific to the application here.
Let H denote the parameter space of H. For any vector function H ∈ H, H : R2IJ →
[0, 1]2IJ+I+J . In addition, H(·) will contain J distinct subvectors of dimension I + 1, each of which
will sum to one, and also I distinct subvectors of dimension J + 1, each of which will also sum to
1. Despite these restrictions, H ∈ H is an unknown vector function and thus there exists an inde-
terminacy between the unknown vector function H and the parameters of interest α and β. That
is, without imposing further restrictions on the parameters and the covariates, it is not possible to
identify (H,α, β) ∈ H × RIdx × RJdz . The following definitions are introduced to formalize the idea
of non-identification in Lemma 4.1.
DEFINITION: Two distinct parameter vectors (α, β) and (α∗, β∗) are said to be observationally equiv-
alent (
o.e.∼ ) if there exist H,H∗ ∈ H such that E(Y |X,Z) = H(Xα,Zβ) = H∗(Xα∗, Zβ∗).
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DEFINITION: (α, β) is said to be identified if there does not exist (α∗, β∗) 6= (α, β) such that
(α∗, β∗) o.e.∼ (α, β).
We can write α = (α1, α2, . . . , αI) = (αi, α−i) for any i ∈ I where α−i = (α1, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αI) ∈
Rdx × RI−1. Similarly, we can write β = (β1, β2, . . . , βJ) = (βj , β−j) for any j ∈ J where β−j =
(β1, . . . , βj−1, βj+1, . . . , βJ) ∈ Rdz × RJ−1.
Lemma 4.1 In the multiple index model given by (10) we have the following:
(a) For any c 6= 0, given i ∈ I and j ∈ J, let α∗ = (cαi, α−i) and β∗ = (cβj , β−j). Then,
(α∗, β)o.e.∼ (α, β∗)o.e.∼ (α, β).
(b) If Xij = Xi′j for i 6= i′, then (α, β)o.e.∼ (α∗, β) where α∗ = (αi−αi′ , α−i). Similarly, if Zij = Zij′
for j 6= j′, then (α, β)o.e.∼ (α, β∗) where β∗ = (βj − βj′ , β−j).
(c) If Xij is a subvector of Zi′j′ , then (α, β)
o.e.∼ (α, β∗) where β∗ = (βj′ − µ1α, β−j′), and µ1 is a
dz × dx selection matrix such that Xij = Zi′j′µ1. Similarly, if Zij is a subvector of Xi′j′ , then
(α, β)
o.e.∼ (α∗, β) where α∗ = (αi′ − µ2β, α−i′), and µ2 is a dx × dz selection matrix such that
Zij = Xi′j′µ2.
Lemma 4.1 suggests some necessary conditions for identification of α and β. Part (a) implies
that we need to restrict the parameter space of α and β in such a way that scaling is not possible
for any of the coefficients of the linear indices. Here it is convenient to assume
αi = (1, α˜i), ∀ i ∈ I and βj = (1, β˜j), ∀ j ∈ J.
Parts (b) and (c) suggest that we will need some exclusion restrictions. If Xij is the same random
variable as Xi′j , then αi cannot be distinguished from αi′ . Therefore, there needs to be at least
one component of Xij that is not included in Xi′j and vice-versa. This implies we cannot have
Xij invariant with respect to i. That is, we cannot have Xij = Xi′j = Xj . Thus, we need at
least one variable in the vector Xij (say X
(1)
ij ) that varies with match type (i, j). However, if
α1 = α2 = · · · = αI , then we do not need this exclusion. Similarly, Zij cannot be invariant with
respect to j, so we can distinguish between βj and βj′ . Finally, we also need exclusion restrictions
so that we can distinguish between the α’s and β’s. The following set of exclusion restrictions are
sufficient to rule out these non-identifiable cases.
Assumption 4.2 (a) Each Xij , (i, j) ∈ I×J, contains a continuous explanatory variable X(1)ij with
a non-zero coefficient normalized to one. That is, Xijαi = X
(1)
ij +X
(2)
ij α˜i. Further, X
(1)
ij 6= X(1)i′j
for any i 6= i′.
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(b) Each Zij , (i, j) ∈ I × J, contains a continuous explanatory variable Z(1)ij with a non-zero co-
efficient normalized to one. That is, Zijβj = Z
(1)
ij + Z
(2)
ij β˜j . Further, Z
(1)
ij 6= Z(1)ij′ for any
j 6= j′.
(c) For every (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ I × J, X(2)ij is not contained in the covariate vector Z(2)i′j′ (and, vice-
versa).
First note that we only require the existence of one variable that is continuously distributed in
each index. This assumption is necessary because, if all the regressors were discrete, then the model
has no information. Bierens and Hartog (1988) shows this result for a single-index model. However,
we do not require a large support assumption for identification of α and β.
Assumption 4.2 helps eliminate the non-identifiable cases. We can understand this in the context
of the marriage example in Section 2.1. Here, agents care about having similar expected education
levels to their spouse. This is captured by the random variable X
(1)
ij = Xij,educ ≡ |Xi,educ −Xj,educ|,
which is a different random variable for each pair (i, j). Therefore, in each index included in the list
Xtα, X
(1)
ij will be the excluded random variable. That is, X
(1)
ij and X
(1)
i′j are two separate random
variables that act as instruments for distinguishing between αi and αi′ , where i 6= i′. For this same
reason, we can set Z
(1)
ij = X
(1)
ij , then the excluded variables X
(1)
ij and X
(1)
ij′ act as instruments that
distinguish between βj and βj′ , where j 6= j′. Thus, including a covariate that is different for each
possible pair (i, j) satisfies Assumptions 4.2(a)-(b). Also, we include Xj,inc in X
(2)
ij and Zi,inc in
Z
(2)
ij . Note that Xj,inc and Zi,inc are I + J different random variables, and thus Assumption 4.2(c)
is satisfied. Here, Xj,inc and Zi,inc act as instruments to distinguish between the α’s and the β’s.
We further impose some smoothness and non-linearity assumptions on H which will be sufficient
for identification of the finite dimensional parameters α and β.
Assumption 4.3 (a) Each Hqij, where q = a, (i, j) ∈ I× (J∪{0}), or q = b, (i, j) ∈ (I∪{0})×J,
is differentiable with respect to the continuous covariates.
(b) Let Hqij,r denote the partial derivative of H
q
ij with respect to the r
th argument. Then, for each
q = a, (i, j) ∈ I × (J ∪ {0}) and q = b, (i, j) ∈ (I ∪ {0}) × J, the derivative functions Hqij,r,
r = 1, · · · , 2IJ are linearly independent with probability one on X IJ ×ZIJ .
The first part of Assumption 4.3 is simply a smoothness restriction on each component function
of vector function H. The second part of this assumption imposes a mild restriction on the shape of
the component functions of H. It requires the partial derivative of each component of H to be linearly
independent. A sufficient condition for this to hold is for the generalized Wronskian for derivative
functions Hqij,r, r = 1, · · · , 2IJ to not be zero.8 A further sufficient condition for the generalized
8Generalized Wronskians are determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the derivative function. To check this condition
we will need the derivative functions Hqij,r to be differentiable with respect to the continuous covariates.
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Wronskian to not be zero is that Hqij is non-linear in each of its arguments. This does not seem so
strong since Hqij is made up of joint distribution functions Fij or Gij which are typically non-linear.
Our identification strategy is such that Assumption 4.3 is only sufficient to identify components
of αi and βj that are coefficients to continuous covariates. However, we allow X
(2)
ij and Z
(2)
ij to contain
discrete random variables.9 Let ρxij be a vector of discrete covariates contained in X
(2)
ij , and ρ
z
ij be a
vector of discrete covariates contained in Z
(2)
ij . Denote the subvector of αi that is the coefficient of
ρxij by
˜˜αi, and the subvector of βj that is the coefficient of ρ
z
ij by
˜˜
βj . Define ˜˜α = (˜˜α1, . . . , ˜˜αI) and
˜˜
β = (
˜˜
β1, . . . ,
˜˜
βJ). Then we need the following additional assumption:
Assumption 4.4 Let ρijt ∈ Ω be a vector consisting of distinct components of ρxij and ρzij. Then,
there exists two points ρ = (ρx11, ...ρ
x
ij , . . . , ρ
z
11, . . . ρ
z
ij , . . . ) and ρ¯ = (ρ¯
x
11, ...ρ¯
x
ij , . . . , ρ¯
z
11, . . . ρ¯
z
ij , . . . ) in
Ω2IJ such that if ˜˜α0 6= ˜˜α and ˜˜β0 6= ˜˜β, then
H(· · · , Xijtαi + ρxijt( ˜˜αi0 − ˜˜αi), · · · , Zijtβj + ρzijt( ˜˜βj0 − ˜˜βj), · · · )
6= H(· · · , Xijtαi + ρ¯xijt( ˜˜αi0 − ˜˜αi), · · · , Zijtβj + ρ¯zijt( ˜˜βj0 − ˜˜βj), · · · ).
That is, to identify coefficients corresponding to discrete regressors, we need at least two distinct
points in its support at which the function can be distinguished.
Proposition 4.5 Let Assumptions 2.1-2.2 and 4.2-4.4 hold. Then, α and β are identified (up to a
multiplicative scalar) in the multi-index model given by (10).
We have point identification of parameter vectors α and β. However, we have said nothing so
far about the identification of the link function H. Note that H : R2IJ → [0, 1]2IJ+I+J . Without
a large (i.e., unbounded) support assumption it may not be possible to point identify the unknown
vector of link functions. Instead, under Assumption 4.2(a), H will be partially identified. Let
X = X1 × X−1 ⊆ R × Rdx−1, where X1 denotes the support of the excluded regressor X(1)ij , and let
Z = Z1 ×Z−1 ⊆ R× Rdz−1, where Z1 denotes the support of the excluded regressor Z(1)ij , for every
(i, j) ∈ I× J. The following proposition discusses identification of H.
Proposition 4.6 Let Assumptions 2.1-2.2 and 4.2-4.4 hold.
(a) If X1 = R and Z1 = R, then H is point identified.
(b) If X is a compact subset of Rdx, or Z is a compact subset of and Rdz , then H ∈ H is partially
identified. Further, the identified set, HI , will be a strict subset of H.
H is not directly the object of interest in this paper. However, depending on the estimation
method, the point or partial identification of H may be relevant for doing inference on α and β.
9In the marriage example in Section 2.1, we could have takenXj,inc as the mode of income instead of the expected
income, for type j women (where income has discrete support {high=3, medium=2, low=1},say). In this case for every
j ∈ J, Xj,inc is a discrete random variable.
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5 Conclusion
This paper considers the identification problem in a one-to-one matching model with transferable
utilities. This framework builds on Choo and Siow (2006), where the objective is to identify system-
atic preferences from the knowledge of match patterns observed over some characteristics. We extend
this framework in two salient ways. First, we explicitly model the systematic preferences of agents
by introducing covariates through linear indices. Introducing covariates in preferences aids us in un-
derstanding the role of the different covariates in determining a match outcome. Second, we consider
match patterns only over a subset of observed characteristics (which we call types). The systematic
preferences for each match type are then described by the remaining observed characteristics. This
allows us to discern preferences based on several observed agent characteristics, without increasing
the dimension of the match outcome matrix, which describes matching patterns over types. We also
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the agent preferences, but make no distributional assumptions
over it. Instead, we consider a sample from multiple markets. With such preferences and some
additional assumptions, we show that transfers depend only on systematic preferences. Using this
result on transfers, the matching model is reduced to a semiparametric multi-index model. We then
study identification of the relevant parameters in this reduced form.
Several issues remain for future research. The systematic preferences are modeled with covari-
ates, which are aggregated at the level of types. This imposes a qualitative restriction on agent
preferences that every match partner of same type is exchangeable. The question then is if we can
relax exchangeability in these models. Another question is how much one can learn from considering
just one market when knowledge of the distribution of the taste shocks is not assumed.
In principal, semiparametric multi-index models can be estimated using sieve minimum distance
estimator of Ai and Chen (2003), or a semiparametric kernel estimator of Ichimura and Lee (1991).
However, the high dimensionality of the functions inH prevents these estimators from performing well
in finite sample. Hristache et al. (2001) provides a method for dimension reduction in multiple-index
models, thus selecting smaller number of relevant indices. One can possibly construct estimators in
the family of average derivative estimators extending methods of Hristache, Juditsky, and Spokoiny
(2001), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
20
References
[1] Agarwal, N. and W. Diamond (2017): “Latent Indices In Assortative Matching Models,” Quan-
titative Economics,8(3), 685–728.
[2] Ai, C. and X. Chen (2003): “Efficient Estimation of Models with Conditional Moment Restric-
tions Containing Unknown Functions,” Econometrica, 71 (6), 1795-1843.
[3] Banerjee, A., E. Duflo, M. Ghatak, and J. Lafortune (2013): “Marry for What? Caste and Mate
Selection in Modern India,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2), 33-72.
[4] Becker, G. (1973): “A Theory of Marriage, part I,” Journal of Political Economy, 81 (4), 813-
846.
[5] Becker, G. (1974): “A Theory of Marriage, part II,” Journal of Political Economy, 82 (2),
S11-26.
[6] Bierens, H.J. and J. Hartog (1988): “Non-Linear Regression with Discrete Explanatory Vari-
ables, with an Application to the Earnings Function,” Journal of Econometrics, 38, 269-299.
[7] Botticini, M., and A. Siow (2008): “Are there Increasing Returns in Marriage Markets?,” Uni-
versity of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 333.
[8] Chiappori, P.-A., S. Oreffice, and C. Quintana-Domeque (2012): “Fatter Attraction: Anthro-
pometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market,” Journal of Political Economy,
120 (4), 659-695.
[9] Chiappori, P.-A., and B. Salanie´ (2016): “The Econometrics of Matching Models,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 54(3), 832-861.
[10] Chiappori, P.-A., B. Salanie´, and Y. Weiss (2017): “Partner Choice, Investment in Children,
and the Marital College Premium,” American Economic Review, 107 (8), 2109-67.
[11] Choo, E., and A. Siow (2006): “Who Marries Whom and Why?,” Journal of Political Economy,
114, 175-201.
[12] Dagsvik, J.K. (2000): “Aggregation in Matching Markets,” International Economic Review, 41
(February), 27–57.
[13] Dupuy, A. and A. Galichon (2014): “Personality Traits and the Marriage Market,” Journal of
Political Economy, 122 (6), 1271-319.
[14] Echenique, F., S. Lee, M. Shum, and M.B. Yenmez (2013): “The Revealed Preference Theory
of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings,” Econometrica, 81, 153-171.
21
[15] Fox, J.T. (2009): “Structural Empirical Work Using Matching Models,” in S.N. Durlauf and
L.E. Blume (Eds.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Online ed.)
[16] Fox, J.T. (2010): “Identification in Matching Games,” Quantitative Economics, 1, 203-254.
[17] Fox, J.T., D. Hsu, and C. Yang (2017): “Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games,”
Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
[18] Gabaix, X. and A. Landier (2008): “Why has CEO pay increased so much?,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49-100.
[19] Galichon, A., and B. Salanie´ (2015): “Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification
in Matching Models,” Columbia University Discussion Paper 1415-02.
[20] Galichon, A., S.D. Kominers and S. Weber (2016): “Costly Concessions: An Empirical Frame-
work for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility,” Unpublished manuscript.
[21] Graham, B. (2011): “Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems in the
Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers,” in Handbook of Social Economics, ed. by
J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson, Elsevier.
[22] Graham, B. (2013a): “ Errata in ’Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems
in the Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers’,” Unpublished manuscript.
[23] Graham, B. (2013b): “Comparative static and computational methods for an empirical one-to-
one transferable utility matching model,” Advances in Econometrics 31: 153 - 181.
[24] Gretsky, N.E., J.M. Ostroy, and W.R. Zame (1992): “The nonatomic assignment model,” Eco-
nomic Theory, 2, 103–127.
[25] Gretsky, N.E., J.M. Ostroy, and W.R. Zame (1999): “Perfect competition in the continuous
assignment model,” Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 60–118.
[26] Hristache, M., A. Juditsky, and V. Spokoiny (2001): “Direct estimation of the index coefficients
in a single-index model,” Annals of Statistics, 29, 1-32.
[27] Hristache, M., A. Juditsky, J. Polzehl, and V. Spokoiny (2001): “Structure Adaptive Approach
for Dimension Reduction,” Annals of Statistics, 29, 1537-1566.
[28] Ichimura, H. and Lee, L.-F. (1991): “Semiparametric Least Squares Estimation of multiple
index models: Single equation estimation,” in Nonparametric and Semiparametric Methods in
Econometrics and Statistics, ed. by W.A. Barnett, J. Powell, and G. Tauchen.
22
[29] Koopmans, T.C. and M. Beckmann (1957): “Assignment Problems and the Location of Eco-
nomic Activities,” Econometrica, 25 (1), 53–76.
[30] Menzel, K. (2015): “Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems,” Econometrica,
83 (3), 897-941.
[31] Roth, A.E. and M.A.O. Sotomayor (1990): “Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis,” Cambridge University Press.
[32] Salanie´, B. (2015): “Identification in Separable Matching with Observed Transfers,” Columbia
University mimeo.
[33] Shapley, L., and M. Shubik (1972): “The Assignment Game I: The Core,” International Journal
of Game Theory, 1, 111-130.
[34] Siow, A., and E. Choo (2006): “Estimating a Marriage Matching Model with Spillover Effects,”
Demography, 43(3), 463-490.
[35] Tervio, M. (2008): “The difference that CEOs make: An assignment model approach,” American
Economic Review, 98, 642-668.
23
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
The proof builds on the observation that, if t′ and t′′ are distinct markets with Xt′α = Xt′′α and
Zt′β = Zt′′β and St′ = St′′ , then the equilibrium matching must be the same in each market (up
to values of the preference shocks that have zero measure). This follows because the equilibrium
matching in each market is efficient, and because efficient matchings are uniquely determined (up to
values of the preference shocks that have zero measure; see, e.g., Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1999)).
Given that the equilibrium matchings are identical in both markets, we then verify that equilibrium
transfers must be identical.
Consider a transfer function
γ¯ : X IJ × RIJ ×ZIJ × RIJ ×∆I+J → T ⊆ RI×J ,
such that the equilibrium transfers Γt in each market t are given by the matrix γ¯(Xt, Xtα,Zt, Ztβ, St),
with (i, j)th element γ¯ij(Xt, Xtα,Zt, Ztβ, St). If the result in the proposition fails to hold, then
there exist distinct markets t′ and t′′ with Xt′α = Xt′′α, Zt′β = Zt′′β and St′ = St′′ , but with
γ¯ij(Xt′ ,Xt′α,Zt′ , Zt′β, St′) 6= γ¯ij(Xt′′ , Xt′′α,Zt′′ , Zt′′β, St′′) for some (i, j).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that
γ¯ij(Xt′ , Xt′α,Zt′ , Zt′β, St′) < γ¯ij(Xt′′ , Xt′′α,Zt′′ , Zt′′β, St′′).
By Assumption 2.2(b), there exists a positive measure of shocks εk′t′ , k
′ ∈ Nat′ with i(k′) = i, such
that
Xijt′αi + ε¯k′jt′ − γ¯ij(Xt′ , Xt′α,Zt′ , Zt′β, St′) > Xij′t′αi + ε¯k′j′t′ − γ¯ij′(Xt′ , Xt′α,Zt′ , Zt′β, St′)
for all j′ ∈ J \ {j} and
Xijt′αi + ε¯k′jt′ − γ¯ij(Xt′ , Xt′α,Zt′ , Zt′β, St′) > ε¯k′0t′ ,
implying that the agent k′ in market t′ optimally chooses to match with j, and yet
ε¯k′0t′ > Xij′t′αi + ε¯k′j′t′ − γ¯ij′(Xt′′ , Xt′′α,Zt′′ , Zt′′β, St′′),
for all j′ ∈ J, implying that the agent k′ would prefer to remain unmatched given the transfers that
prevail in market t′′ (for this, it is enough to consider values ε¯k′j′t′ , for j′ 6= j, that are sufficiently
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small). Hence, if k′′ ∈ Nat′′ is an agent in market t′′ with εk′′t′′ = εk′t′ , we have
ε¯k′′0t′′ > Xij′t′′αi + ε¯k′j′t′′ − γ¯ij′(Xt′′ , Xt′′α,Zt′′ , Zt′′β, St′′),
implying that the agent k′′ prefers to remain unmatched in market t′′. Since this holds for a positive
measure of shocks, the match allocations are different for a positive measure of agents in the two
markets t′ and t′′, contradicting that the (essentially) unique allocations in both sides coincide. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
For Part (a) of the lemma, let the true parameters that satisfy equation (10) be given by (H,α, β) ∈
H × RIdx × RJdz . Consider α˜ = (α1, · · · , αi−1, cαi, αi+1, · · · , αI) for some c 6= 0. Let Xijtαi, j =
0, 1, 2, · · · , J be the first J+1 arguments of the vector function H. Also split the first IJ+ I compo-
nents of H into distinct subvector of J+1 dimension (Ha1 , H
a
2 , · · · , HaI ) where Hai = (hai0, hai1, ..., haiJ).
And, split the remaining IJ + J components of H into distinct subvector of I + 1 dimension
(Hb1 , H
b
2 , · · · , HbJ ) where Hbj = (hb0j , hb1j , ..., hbIj).
Define a vector function H˜ such that, in H˜ai set h˜
a
i0 = 1 −
∑J
j=1 h˜
a
ij for all i ∈ I; in H˜bj
set h˜b0j = 1 −
∑I
i=1 h˜
b
ij for all j ∈ J; and h˜qij(·, ·, · · · ) = hqij
(
1
c ·, ·, · · ·
)
, where only the first J + 1
arguments are scaled by 1c , where q ∈ {a,b} and (i, j) ∈ I×J. Then, (H˜, β, α˜) ∈ H×RIdx×RJdz . By
construction we will have that H˜(Xtα˜, Ztβ) = H(Xtα,Ztβ). Therefore the data cannot distinguish
between α and cα, and therefore we can only identify α up to a scaled normalization. Similarly we
can scale components of β.
The arguments are identical for both (b) and (c). So we will just show it for part (c). Without
loss of generality, suppose for every (i, j) ∈M, Xijt = Zijtµ where µ is a dz×dx dimensional selection
matrix. Let the true parameters that satisfy equation (10) be given by (H,α, β). Let β˜ = β − µα.
Construct a vector function H˜ as follows:
In H˜ai set h˜
a
i0 = 1−
∑J
j=1 h˜
a
ij for all i ∈ I; and in H˜bj set h˜b0j = 1−
∑I
i=1 h˜
b
ij for all j ∈ J, where
h˜qi′j′(· · · , Xijtαi, Zijtβ˜j , · · · ) = h˜qi′j′(· · · , Xijtαi, Zijtβj −Xijtαi, · · · ) = hqi′j′(· · · , Xijtαi, Zijtβj , · · · ),
for any q ∈ {a,b} and (i′, j′) ∈ I× J. Therefore the data cannot distinguish between elements of β
and β˜ that correspond to the coefficients of Xijt. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5:
Suppose there exists (α0, β0) and (α, β) such that
E[Yt|Xtα0, Ztβ0] = E[Yt|Xtα,Ztβ] = H(Xtα0, Ztβ0) (11)
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almost everywhere in the support of (Xt, Zt). By Assumption 4.2 let αi = (1, α˜i) and βj = (1, β˜j).
Further we can write Xijtαi = X
(1)
ijt + X
(2)
ijt α˜i and Zijtβj = Z
(1)
ijt + Z
(2)
ijt β˜j for all (i, j) ∈ I × J. Let
X
(2)
ijt ∈ X−1 ⊆ Rdx−1 and Z(2)ijt ∈ Z−1 ⊆ Rdz−1. Let wijt ∈ W ⊆ Rdw be a vector of distinct elements
of X
(2)
ijt and Z
(2)
ijt . Assumption 4.2(d) implies 1 + max(dx − 1, dz − 1) ≤ dw ≤ dx + dz − 2. Let
X
(1)
t ≡ (X(1)11t, · · · , X(1)1Jt, · · · , X(1)IJt) be an IJ dimensional vector, Z(1)t ≡ (Z(1)11t, · · · , Z(1)I1t, · · · , Z(1)IJt) be
an IJ dimensional vector, and wt ≡ (w11t, · · · , w1Jt, · · · , wIJt, ) has IJ components. Then let W
denote the support of (X
(1)
t , Z
(1)
t , wt).
Let δxijt = Xijtα and δ
z
ijt = Zijtβ. Define δijt = (δ
x
ijt, δ
z
ijt) and δt be the vector of all δijt,
(i, j) ∈ I× J. Then we can write
H(· · · , Xijtαi0, · · · , Zijtβj0, · · · ) = H(· · · , δxijt +X(2)ijt (α˜i0 − α˜i), · · · , δzijt + Z(2)ijt (β˜0j − β˜j), · · · ).
Combining this with equation (11) we get that
H(· · · , δxijt +X(2)ijt (α˜i0 − α˜i), · · · , δzijt + Z(2)ijt (β˜j0 − β˜j), · · · ) = φ(δt), (12)
where φ(δt) = E[Yt|δt]. Note that for any δt and wt we can compute xt and zt given α and β. So we
can view the left hand side of the equation as a function of δt and wt only.
First let all the regressors be continuous, we can choose a point (X¯(1), Z¯(1), w¯) in the interior
of W. Fix δ¯ to be δt evaluated at (X¯(1), Z¯(1), w¯). Since all of X(1), Z(1), w consist of continuous
variables, it is possible to have a neighborhood N(w¯) in the support of w such that equation (12)
holds for all w ∈ N(w¯) conditional on δ¯. That is we have
H(· · · , δ¯xijt +X(2)ijt (α˜i0 − α˜i), · · · , δ¯zijt + Z(2)ijt (β˜j0 − β˜j), · · · ) = φ(δ¯t), ∀ w ∈ N(w¯).
Differentiating the above equation with respect to w and evaluating at w¯ we get, for each q ∈ {a,b},
and (i, j) ∈M we have that
J∑
r=1
Hqij,r(X¯α0, Z¯β0)(α˜10 − α˜1) + · · ·+
IJ∑
r=(I−1)J+1
Hqij,r(X¯α0, Z¯β0)(α˜I0 − α˜I)+
+
IJ+I∑
r=IJ+1
Hqij,r(X¯α0, Z¯β0)(β˜10 − β˜1) + · · ·+
2IJ∑
r=2IJ−I+1
Hqij,r(X¯α0, Z¯β0)(β˜J0 − β˜J) = 0.
Since (X¯(1), Z¯(1), w¯) is an arbitrary point in the interior ofW and measure of boundary ofW is zero,
the above equation holds with probability one on W. Then by Assumption 4.3(b) we must have
α0 = α and β0 = β.
Now suppose we allow wijt to contain discrete regressors. Then by above arguments the coeffi-
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cients corresponding to continuous regressors are identified as before. Note that equation (12) holds
regardless of whether regressors in wijt are continuous or discrete. Thus we are left with,
H(· · · , Xijtαi + ρxijt( ˜˜αi0 − ˜˜αi), · · · , Zijtβj + ρzijt( ˜˜βj0 − ˜˜βj), · · · )
= H(· · · , Xijtαi + ρ¯xijt( ˜˜αi0 − ˜˜αi), · · · , Zijtβj + ρ¯zijt( ˜˜βj0 − ˜˜βj), · · · )
= φ(δt).
Then the result follows from Assumption 4.4 
Proof of Proposition 4.6:
The parameters α and β are identified. First consider the case where X1 = R and Z1 = R. Then
Xijtαi = X
(1)
ijt +X
(2)
ijt α˜i and Zijtαi = Z
(1)
ijt + Z
(2)
ijt β˜j . Consider any point
r ≡ (rx11, rx12, · · · , rxIJ , rz11, rz12 · · · , rzIJ) ∈ R2IJ .
Fix value of X
(2)
ijt α˜i = φij and Z
(2)
ijt β˜j = ψij . Then there will always exist X
(1)
ijt = r
x
ij − φij and
Z
(1)
ijt = r
z
ij − ψij , such that every component Hqij in H is identified at point r. Since r ∈ R2IJ is
arbitrary, H is identified.
Alternatively, in the second part of the proposition, X and Z are assumed to be compact subset
of Rdx . Then Xαi is a continuous mapping from X to R, for all i ∈ I, and Zβj is a continuous
mapping from Z to R, for all j ∈ J. Then also Xαi and Zβj are compact subsets of R. Therefore,
H is identified on the compact subset (Xα1)J × · · · × (XαI)J × (Zβ1)I × · · · × (ZβJ)I of R2IJ . By
Assumption 4.2 this compact set has positive measure since at least one of the covariates of both X
and Z are continuously distributed on its support. Therefore, HI ( H. 
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